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I. INTRODUCTION 
The purposes of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 19641 are clear. The primary 
object of title VII is "to remove barriers that have operated in the past to favor an 
identifiable group of white employees over other employees."2 "It is also the purpose of 
Title VII to make persons whole for injuries suffered on account of unlawful employ-
ment discrimination."3 The twin goals of ensuring equal employment opportunities and 
granting "make whole" relief to victims of discrimination have proven more elusive than 
imagined in 1964. The parameters of the remedies which may be fashioned to achieve 
these goals have yet to be defined by the Supreme Court. 
Section 706(g) of title VII4 invests broad equitable discretion in the federal courts 
to effectuate the "make whole" objective of title VIP Section 706(g) aims "to make the 
victims of unlawful discrimination whole" by restoring them "so far as possible ... to a 
position where they would have been were it not for the unlawful discrimination."6 The 
function and scope of 706(g) have perplexed courts since the onset of title VII litigation. 
The Supreme Court has often attempted to set the constitutional limitations of race 
conscious relief under 706(g). However, there is a dispute in the Supreme Court as to 
whether courts, after a finding of discrimination, can grant relief under 706(g) which 
benefits both the actual victims of discrimination and nonvictims. 
Both sides of the section 706(g) dispute base their positions on interpretations of 
the legislative history of 706(g). This note will examine the Supreme Court's most recent 
attempts to define the class of individuals entitled to race conscious relief under 706(g), 
142 U.S.C. § 2000e-2000e-17 (1982). 
2 Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 429 (1971). 
3 Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 418 (1975). 
442 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1982). Section 706(g) states "if the court finds that the respondent 
has intentionally engaged in or is intentionally engaging in, an unlawful employment practice ... , 
the court may enjoin the respondent from engaging in such unlawful employment practice, and 
order such affirmative action as may be appropriate, which may include, but is not limited to, 
reinstatement or hiring of employees, with or without backpay ... , or any other equitable relief as 
the court deems appropriate .... No order of the court shall require the admission or reinstatement 
of an individual as a member of a union, or the hiring, reinstatement, or promotion of an individual 
as an employee, or the payment to him of any back pay, if such individual was refused admission, 
suspended, or expelled, or was refused employment or advancement or was suspended or dis-
charged for any reason other than discrimination on account of race, color, religion, sex, or national 
origin .... " 
5 Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747, 763 (1976). 
6 Albemarle, 422 U.S. at 421 (quoting 118 CONGo REC. 7168 (1972)). 
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focusing on the legislative history cited by each side in defense of its position. This note 
concludes that 706(g) remedies should not be limited solely to the actual victims of 
discrimination. While the legislative history is characteristically murky in certain areas, 
it indicates that Congress did not intend to preclude non victims from benefitting from 
race conscious relief. 
II. THE SHEET METAL WORKERS AND FIREFIGHTERS HOLDINGS 
The Supreme Court's most recent attempts to enunciate the limits of 706(g) relief 
are Local Number 93 v. City of Cleveland 7 and Local 28 Of Sheet Metal Workers v. EEOC.8 
Firefighters and Sheet Metal Workers, decided the same day, addressed the issue of defining 
the class of individuals entitled to 706(g) relief. Limiting race conscious relief to a specific 
class of individuals will similarly limit the types of remedies courts may order. Limiting 
section 706(g) relief to minority individuals who have been the actual victims of a 
particular employer's or labor union's racial discrimination would preclude the use of 
racial quotas or preferences which are targeted at racial or minority groups in general. 
In Sheet Metal Workers, a sharply divided Supreme Court, by a vote of 5 to 4, affirmed 
a Second Circuit decision9 imposing race conscious remedies upon the petitioner labor 
union and apprenticeship committee. IO In view of the employer's and labor union's 
egregious history of discrimination, the Court upheld both a membership goal and fund 
order established by the district court below. ll The membership goal was originally set 
by the District Court for the Southern District of New York at 29% nonwhite membership 
in the union, a percentage based on the percentage of nonwhites in the relevant labor 
pool in New York City.12 The court of appeals affirmed a revised figure of 29.23%.13 
The fund was established by the district court after the petitioners were held in civil 
contempt for disobeying the court's orders. The court of appeals affirmed the order 
requiring the employer and labor union to place their $150,000 contempt fine in a fund 
to increase nonwhite membership in the apprenticeship program and union. 14 
The principal issue in Sheet Metal Workers, "whether the remedial provisions of Title 
VII ... empower a district court to order race-conscious relief that may benefit individ-
uals who are not identified victims of unlawful discrimination,"15 was not decided by a 
majority of the Court. Justice Brennan's discussion of the scope of 706(g), joined by 
Justices Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens, held that 706(g) "does not prohibit a court 
from ordering, in appropriate circumstances, affirmative race-conscious relief as a rem-
7 Local Number 93 v. City of Cleveland, 106 S. Ct. 3063 (1986). Local Number 93 will be referred 
to throughout this article as Firefighters v. Cleveland. 
8 Local 28 Of Sheet Metal Workers v. EEOC, 106 S. Ct. 3019 (1986). 
9 Local 28 Of Sheet Metal Workers v. EEOC, 753 F.2d 1172 (1976). 
10 106 S. Ct. at 3034. Sheet Metal Workers included a number of Title VII issues beyond the 
scope of this paper's analysis, including the accuracy of the percentage membership goal established, 
the imposition of criminal contempt charges against the petitioner, and the appointment by the 
district court of an administrator to supervise the petitioner's compliance with the court's orders. 
11 EEOC v. Local 28 Of Sheet Metal Workers, 401 F. Supp. 467 (1975). 
12 Local 28 Of Sheet Metal Workers, 106 S. Ct. at 3028. 
13 Local 28 Of Sheet Metal Workers, 753 F.2d at 1186. 
14Id. 
15 106 S. Ct. at 3025. 
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edy for past discrimination."16 This view upholds quotas like the 29.23% hiring goal 
established by the court of appeals. Justice White agreed that section 706(g) "does not 
bar relief for nonvictims in all circumstances," but chose to dissent from the opinion of 
the court. I7 Justice Powell, concurring in part and concurring in the judgment, stated 
that neither the plain language of title VII nor its legislative history "support a view that 
all remedies must be limited to benefitting victims."18 Justice O'Connor's concurrence in 
part and dissent in part did not address the victim/nonvictim issue. I9 Chief Justice 
Rehnquist, joined in dissent by then Chief Justice Burger, rejected the use of hiring 
quotas and argued that 706(g) limits relief to the actual victims of discrimination.20 The 
fragmented Court failed to muster the requisite five votes needed to decide the section 
706(g) issue as a matter of law and precedent. However, the Justices' opinions in Sheet 
Metal Workers indicate that at least five Justices believe that relief to nonvictims, including 
hiring goals and quotas, is sometimes allowable. 
The Court in Firefighters held that 706(g) does not preclude entry of a consent decree 
which might benefit individuals who were not the actual victims of the defendant's 
discriminatory practices.21 The majority opinion, authored by Justice Brennan, and 
joined by Justices Marshall, Blackmun, Powell, Stevens, and O'Connor, held that a 
consent decree, because of its voluntary nature, is not limited by section 706(g).22 
In holding that a federal court may enter a consent decree awarding broader relief 
than that which may be awarded after a full trial, the Court clearly sidestepped the 
principal issue of defining the limits of 706(g) relief. Justice O'Connor emphasized that 
"[t]he Court holds that the relief provided in a consent decree need not conform to the 
limits on court-ordered relief imposed by § 706(g), whatever those limits may be."23 
Justice White, arguing in dissent that the consent decree exceeded the limits of a 
permissible remedy for the discriminatory practices shown, repeated his belief that 706(g) 
permits relief to nonvictims. "[I]n Title VII cases, enjoining discriminatory practices and 
granting relief only to victims of past discrimination is the general rule, with relief for 
nonvictims being reserved for particularly egregious conduct."24 Chief Justice Rehnquist, 
in a dissent again joined by then Chief Justice Burger, reiterated his Sheet Metal Workers 
view that 706(g) prohibits relief to those who are not the actual victims of illegal discrim-
ination.2s 
Both sides of the victim/nonvictim issue cite the legislative history of title VII in 
defense of their position.26 Justice Brennan argues that the eighty-eighth Congress, which 
16 !d. at 3034. 
17 [d. at 3062-63 (White, J., dissenting). 
18 [d. at 3054 (Powell, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). 
19 [d. at 3057-62 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) . 
• 0 [d. at 3063 (Rehnquist, j., dissenting). 
'1 106 S. Ct. 3063, 3072 (1986). The consent decree approved was effective for four years and 
required specified numbers of promotions to be given to minority firefighters . 
•• [d. at 3075 . 
• 3 [d. at 3080 (O'Connor, j., concurring) . 
• 4 [d. at 3082 (White, j., concurring). 
'5 [d. at 3085 (Rehnquist, j., dissenting) . 
• 6 Statutory interpretation must, of course, begin with an examination of the statute's plain 
meaning. While relevant, the plain meaning of 706(g) is sufficiently unclear to justify placing 
paramount importance on 706(g)'s legislative history. 
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passed title VII, never considered the issue of appropriate remedies under section 706(g), 
stating: 
[W]hile Congress opposed the use of quotas or preferences merely to main-
tain racial balance, it gave no intimation as to whether such measures would 
be acceptable as remedies for Title VII violations ... the use of racial pref-
erences as a remedy for past discrimination was not an issue at the time Title 
VII was being considered.27 
Justice Brennan justifies Congress' oversight on the grounds that "there was relatively 
little civil rights litigation prior to the adoption of the 1964 Civil Rights Act" and that 
"the cases that had been litigated had not resulted in the sort of affirmative-action 
remedies that, as later became apparent, would sometimes be necessary to eliminate 
effectively the effects of past discrimination."28 
The Brennan interpretation continues to search the legislative history "to determine 
whether Congress intended to preclude a district court from ordering affirmative action 
in appropriate circumstances as a remedy for past discrimination."29 Justice Brennan 
concludes that "[i]n the absence of any indication that Congress intended to limit a 
district court's remedial authority in a way which would frustrate the court's ability to 
enforce Title VII's mandate, we decline to fashion such a limitation ourselves."3o Title 
VII's grant of authority "to fashion the most complete relief possible"3l to eliminate 
discrimination permits affirmative action in some circumstances which may benefit both 
victims and nonvictims. Justice Brennan supports his position with an interpretation of 
the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972,32 which amended title VII in several 
important areas. 
The Rehnquist interpretation of title VII's legislative history, joined by then Chief 
Justice Burger, reflects the interpretation urged by the Solicitor GeneraP3 While relying 
heavily on the Court's earlier holding in Firefighters v. Stotts,34 Chief Justice Rehnquist 
defends his position with legislative history. "Th[e] policy, ... to provide make-whole 
relief only to those who have been actual victims of illegal discrimination, was repeatedly 
expressed by the sponsors of the Act during the Congressional debates."35 
Chief Justice Rehnquist claims that "[l]egislative history can obviously be mustered 
in support of the Court's interpretation of § 706(g) ... the legislative history may be 
fairly apportioned among both sides."36 Although title VII's legislative history is vague 
27 Local 28 Of Sheet Metal Workers v. EEOC, 106 S. Ct. 3019, 3044 (1986). 
28 [d. 
29 [d. 
30 [d. 
31 [d. 
32 Pub. L. No. 92-261, 86 Stat. 103 (1972) (amending 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2000e-17)) 
33 Local 28 Of Sheet Metal Workers, 106 S. Ct. 3019, 3039. 
34 Firefighters v. Stotts, 467 U.S. 561 (1984). The court in Stotts held, inter alia, that a court can 
award competitive seniority only when the beneficiary of the award has been an actual victim of 
discrimination. 467 U.S. at 579-80. The title VII discussion in Stotts is dicta and must be weighted 
accordingly. See Fram, The False Alarm of Firefighters Local No. 1784 v. Stotts, 70 CORNELL L. REv. 991 
(1985). The Stotts holding was a logical outgrowth of the Court's earlier holding in Teamsters v. 
United States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977). Teamsters similarly limited competitive seniority to the actual 
victims of discrimination. 
35 Local Number 93 v. City of Cleveland, 106 S. Ct. 3063, 3085 (1986) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
36 [d.at 3087. 
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and unclear in areas, a careful analysis supports the interpretation that section 706(g) 
was not intended to limit title VII relief solely to the actual victims of discrimination. 
III. AN OVERVIEW OF TITLE VII's LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 
The Civil Rights Act of 1964's passage through Congress has been described as "an 
epic legislative struggle" and a "torturous legislative history."37 H.R. 7152, the bill that 
ultimately became the Civil Rights Act of 1964, was introduced in the House on June 
20, 1963.38 After seemingly endless amendments, proposals, and debate, H.R. 7152 
became law on July 2,1964.39 
While the sheer volume of H.R. 7152's legislative history may never be equaled, it 
is deficient in important areas.40 The Senate version of H.R. 7152 was not sent through 
the usual committee procedure but was debated in informal bipartisan conferences.4l 
Hence, there is not a committee report from the Senate. The eighty-eighth Congress, 
although it discussed 706(g) and the use of quotas, failed to settle the victim/nonvictim 
dispute at issue in Sheet Metal Workers and Firefighters. 
The Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 197242, which amended title VII in 
several areas, is an essential part of title VII's legislative history. These amendments, 
Congress' final attempt to define the scope of title VII relief, establish that relief in title 
VII actions may be fashioned broadly enough to benefit nonvictims. 
A. The Legislative History of Title VII in the House 
H.R. 7152 was introduced in the House on June 20,1963, and referred to the 
Committee on the Judiciary.43 The Judiciary Committee, recognizing the need to address 
the problem of employment discrimination, amended the bill by adding title VII.44 Title 
VII's initial version of section 706(g) stated, in relevant part, "[n]o order of the court 
shall require the admission or reinstatement of an individual as a member of a union 
... if such individual was refused admission, suspended, or expelled ... for cause."45 
The controversy concerning the permissible remedies for discrimination under title 
VII began before the bill even reached the House floor. Opponents of title VII argued 
that the bill would require employers to hire and promote blacks in order to achieve a 
racially balanced work force even in the absence of racial discrimination.46 The Minority 
Report of the Judiciary Committee noted that the term "discrimination" was not defined 
in the bill, and claimed that "the administration intends to rely upon its own construction 
of 'discrimination' as including the lack of racial balance .... "47 The report offered a 
37 Vaas, Title VII: Legislative History, 7 B.C. INDUS. & COM. L. REV. 431,444,445 (1966). Vaas' 
article is clearly the most influential abstract of title VII's legislative history to date. 
38 Local 28 Of Sheet Metal Workers v. EEOC, 106 S. Ct. 3019, 3038 (1986). 
39 Vaas, supra note 37, at 457. 
40 [d. 
4l Brodin, The Standard of Causation in the Mixed-Motive Title VII Action: A Social Policy Perspective, 
82 COLUM. L. REV. 292, 296 n.19 (1982). 
42 Pub. L. No. 92-261, 86 Stat. 103 (1972) (amending 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2000e-17 (1972). 
43 109 CONGo REC. 11252 (1963)). 
44 H.R. Rep. No. 914, 88th. Cong., 1st. Sess., pt. 1,26-32 (1963). 
45 [d. 
46 [d. 
47 [d. at 67-68. 
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number of hypothetical employment situations where an employer would supposedly be 
compelled by title VII to racially balance his work force by the forced hiring or promotion 
of nonvictims of discrimination.48 Republican sponsors addressed the claim of racial 
balancing, stating that title VII would not require "equality with mathematical certainty" 
and that the title would require jobs and union membership to be "strictly filled on the 
basis of qualification."49 
Representative Celler, the Chairman of the Judiciary Committee and the congress-
man responsible for introducing H.R. 7152, was the moving force behind title VII on 
the House floor. 50 Most of the sixteen amendments to title VII adopted by the House 
were proposed by Representative Celler.51 In his opening speech in support of H.R. 
7152, Representative Celler addressed the charges of racial balancing. 52 Claiming that 
others were "seriously misrepresenting what the bill would do and grossly distorting its 
effects," he stated that the claim "that a federal inspector could order the employment 
and promotion only of members of a specific racial or religious group is ... patently 
erroneous."53 Representative Lindsey, another chief proponent of title VII, asserted that 
"[t]his legislation ... does not, as has been suggested heretofore both on and off this 
floor, force acceptance of people in ... jobs ... because they are Negro. It does not 
impose quotas of any special privileges of seniority or acceptance."S4 
Despite these assurances, claims similar to those voiced in the Minority Report 
continued to be heard on the House floor. Representative Abernathy argued that a 
union would be required to recruit a "racially balanced" crew of carpenters, a "racially 
balanced" crew of plumbers, electricians, plasterers, etc., before a construction job could 
begin." 
Responding to the charges that racial imbalance would signify discrimination under 
title VII, and that the title would unacceptably limit management prerogatives,56 Rep-
resentative Celler successfully proposed an amendment to 706(g)Y By substituting the 
words "any reason other than discrimination on account of race" in place of "cause" at 
the end of 706(g), Representative Celler attempted to put these claims to rest. 
[T]he purpose of the amendment is to specify cause ... the court ... cannot 
find any violation of the Act which is based on facts other ... than discrim-
ination on the grounds of race, color, religion, or national origin. [A] dis-
charge [of an employee] might be based, for example, on incompetence or 
a morals charge or theft, but the court can only consider charges based on 
race, color, religion, or national origin. 58 
48/d. at 69. 
49 Id. at 29. 
50 Vaas, supra note 37, at 438. 
5J Id. 
S2 I!O CONGo REC. 1518 (1964). 
53 Id. 
54 Id. at 1540. 
" Id. at 1620. 
56 "[T]itle VII was designed to achieve the elimination of discriminatory practices with minimal 
interference in management's realm." Brodin, supra note 41, at 295. 
57 110 CONGo REC. 2567-71 (1964). 
58 Id. at 2567. 
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The House passed H.R. 7152 on February 10, 1964, by a vote of 290-130, with eleven 
members not voting. 59 
Justice Brennan is correct in stating that although title VII's supporters in the House 
repeatedly asserted that the bill would not require employers or labor unions to imple-
ment hiring or promotional quotas, "[t]he question whether there should be any com-
parable restrictions with respect to a court's use of racial preferences as an appropriate 
remedy for past discrimination under § 706(g) simply did not arise during the House 
debates."6o 
Representative Celler's statements, as Chairman of the House Judiciary Committee 
and the congressman responsible for introducing H.R.7152, must be accorded great 
weight. Representative Celler tried unsuccessfully to dispel the notion that racial imbal-
ance signified discrimination. Representative Celler's amendment to 706(g), making clear 
that title VII would in no way limit an employer's right to hire and fire for lawful reasons, 
was in response to these claims of forced quotas. During the House debate, Represen-
tative Celler never made any reference to the remedies that a district court could order 
after a full trial and finding of discrimination by the court. 
Both proponents and opponents addressed the possibility of forcing quotas onto an 
innocent employer who maintained an imbalanced workforce. Chief Justice Rehnquist, 
in his dissent in Steelworkers v. Weber, stated: 
[T]he battle lines were drawn early in the legislative struggle over Title VII, 
with opponents of the measure charging that agencies ... such as the EEOC, 
by interpreting the word "discrimination" to mean the existence of "racial 
imbalance" would "require" employers to grant preferential treatment to 
minorities, and supporters responding that the EEOC would be granted no 
such power, and that indeed, Title VII prohibits "discrimination" in favor 
of workers because of their race. 61 
Thus Chief Justice Rehnquist recognizes that the proponents of title VII were responding 
to charges that employers would be forced to enforce quotas to maintain a racially 
balanced workforce whether or not the employer was found guilty of discrimination by 
a court. However; Chief Justice Rehnquist cites title VII's legislative history in Firefighters 
and argues that the House was referring to post-trial remedies. The House's legislative 
history makes no reference to the extent of remedies available under 706(g). 
B. The Legislative History of Title VII in the Senate 
The struggle of H.R. 7152 in the Senate has been described as "titanic and pro-
tracted."62 Title VII was debated on the Senate floor for eighty-three days.63 The Senate's 
consideration of H.R. 7152 can be broken down into three principal phases: (1) the 
debate on sending the bill to Committee, (2) the general debate on the bill prior to 
invocation of cloture, and (3) the debate following cloture.64 
59Id. at 2567. 
60 Local 28 Of Sheet Metal Workers v. EEOC, lO6 S. Ct. 3019, 3040 (1986). 
61 Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193,234 (1977) (Rehnquist,j., dissenting). 
62 Vaas, supra note 37, at 443. 
63 110 CONGo REC. 14511 (1964). 
64 Steelworkers, 443 U.S. at 235. 
270 BOSTON COLLEGE THIRD WORLD LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 7:263 
The legislative history in the Senate is atypical. The version of title VII originally 
adopted by the House was modified substantially in the substitute measure adopted by 
the Senate. The substituted bill was not sent through the usual committee procedure. 
As noted, this resulted in the absence of a committee report from the Senate.65 The 
Senate's debate of title VII provides the greatest amount of relevant legislative history 
to the victim/nonvictim issue. 
After two readings on the Senate floor,66 opponents of the bill sought to have it sent 
to the Senate Judiciary Committee for consideration.67 The Senate Judiciary Committee 
was viewed by some as "hostile to civil rights legislation."68 The debate on the motion to 
refer the bill to Committee immediately raised the issues of quotas and balancing. Senator 
Ervin argued that title VII would allow the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission 
(EEOC) to force employers "to hire more persons, not because the employer thought 
he needed more persons, but because the Commission wanted to compel him to employ 
persons of a particular race."69 Senator Hill, another outspoken opponent of title VII, 
agreed that an "employer could be forced to hire additional persons ... although the 
employer might not need the additional employees, and although they might bring his 
business into bankruptcy."70 
Senator Humphrey, "one of the most vocal proponents of H.R. 7152,"71 addressed 
these claims. "The bill does not require [racial quotas] at all. If it did, I would vote 
against it."72 Senator Humphrey stressed that title VII "does not limit the employer's 
freedom to fire, promote, or demote for any reason- or no reasons- so long as his action 
is not based on race"73 and that "[t]he bill would not authorize anyone to order hiring 
or firing to achieve racial or religious balance."7. After seventeen days of debate, the 
Senate chose not to send the bill to Committee, but to take it up directly. 
The formal debate on the merits of H.R. 7152 began on March 30, 1964.75 The 
supporters of the bill, recognizing the great advantages of a bipartisan approach, fash-
ioned a unique system to guide H.R. 7152's passage. Senator Humphrey, the majority 
whip, and Senator Kuchel of California, the minority whip, were chosen as the bill's 
bipartisan leaders. Their roles were to speak generally in favor of the bill and to explain 
its provisions.76 The bipartisan floor leaders also published a "Bipartisan Civil Rights 
Newsletter."" In addition, bipartisan captains were selected to explain each important 
title in detail and to defend it. Senators Clark of Pennsylvania and Case of New Jersey 
were the bipartisan captains responsible for title VI!.'8 
Senator Humphrey, in his opening speech of the formal Seriate debate, assured title 
VII's opponents that: 
65 Vaas, supra note 37, at 443-47. 
66 11 0 CONGo REC. 2882, 3692 (1964). 
67 Local 28 Of Sheet Metal Workers V. EEOC, 106 S. Ct. 3019, 3040 (1986). 
68Id. 
69 110 CONGo REC. 5092 (1964). 
7°Id. 
71 Local 28 Of Sheet Metal Workers, 106 S.Ct. at 3041. 
72 110 CONGo REC. 5092 (1964). 
73 Id. at 5423. 
74Id. at 6455. 
75 Vaas, supra note 37, at 444-45. 
76Id. 
77 Id. 
78Id. 
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Contrary to the allegations of some opponents of this title, there is 
nothing in it that will give any power to the Commission or to any court to 
require hiring, firing, or promotion of employees in order to meet a racial 
"quota" or to achieve a certain racial balance. 
That bugaboo has been brought up a dozen times: but it is nonexistent. 
In fact, the very opposite is true. Title VII prohibits discrimination. In effect, 
it says that race, religion, and national origin are not to be used as the basis 
for hiring and firing. 79 
271 
Senator Kuchel, in the second major speech in support of the bill, confirmed that 
"the court cannot order preferential hiring or promotional considerations for any par-
ticular race, religion, or other group."aD Senators Clark and Case, the bipartisan captains 
in support of title VII, submitted a memorandum reaffirming this interpretation. "There 
is no requirement in title VII that an employer maintain a racial balance in his work 
force ... [a) deliberate attempt to maintain a racial balance ... would involve a violation 
of Title VII."81 The memorandum went on to state that "[n)o court order can require 
hiring, reinstatement, admission to membership, or back pay for anyone who was not 
discriminated against in violation of [title VII). This is stated expressly in the last sentence 
of [706(g))."82 
Other supporters of H.R. 7152 voiced similar assurances concerning the remedial 
powers of title VII. Senator Humphrey promised Senator Robinson that "if [he could) 
find in title VII ... any language which provides that an employer will have to hire on 
the basis of percentage or quota related to color ... I will start eating the pages."83 
Senator Allott stated that "if anyone sees in the bill quotas or percentages, he must read 
that language into it. It is not in the bill."84 
During the Senate's general debate, "a bipartisan group, under the leadership of 
Senators Dirksen, Mansfield, Humphrey, and Kuchel were working outside the floor of 
the Senate to reach agreement on amendments to H.R.7152 that would ensure its 
passage."85 The first Dirksen-Mansfield amendment, in the nature of a substitute for the 
entire bill, "added several provisions defining and clarifying the scope of Title VII's 
substantive provisions."86 In order to finally end the dispute over racial balancing and 
quotas, section 703Ul was added to the amendment. Section 703Ul established in writing 
what title VII's defenders had long argued, specifically, that: 
Nothing contained in this subchapter shall be interpreted to require any 
[employer or labor union) to grant preferential treatment to any individual 
or to any group because of the race ... of such individual or group on 
account of an imbalance which may exist with respect to the total number 
or percentage of persons of that race [employed or admitted to the union] 
in comparison with the total number or percentage of persons in any com-
munity, State .... 87 
79 110 CONGo REC. 6459 (1964). 
80 !d. at 6563. 
Blld.7213. 
82 !d. at 7214. 
83 !d. at 7420. 
84Id. at 8500-01. 
85 Vaas, supra note 37, at 445. 
86 Local 28 Of Sheet Metal Workers v. EEOC, 106 S. Ct. 3019, 3042 (1986). 
87 42 U .S.C. § 2000e-2(j)(1982). 
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Senator Humphrey stated that 703U) "states clearly and accurately what we have 
maintained all along about the bill's intent and meaning."88 Section 703U) apparently 
calmed fears that title VII required racial balancing and preferential treatment.89 Never-
theless, some Senators, most notably Senator Ervin, were still not convinced that the bill 
was so limited.90 
On June 10, 1964, the Senate imposed cloture on its members for the second time 
in its history.91 A limited debate followed on the twenty-four amendments to the second 
Dirksen-Mansfield substitute bill.92 Final statements by the bill's supporters reiterated 
the major points voiced throughout the Senate process. Senator Muskie avowed that the 
bill did not discriminate in favor of blacks at the expense of whites. "[It] seeks to do 
nothing more than to lift the Negro from the status of inequality to one of equality of 
treatment."93 Senator Moss had the final word on the issue of quotas, stating that, "[t]he 
bill does not accord to any citizen advantage or preference ... [and] does not fix quotas 
of employment. In short, the bill does not accord special considerations, it establishes 
equality."94 
On June 19, 1964, the Senate passed the second Dirksen-Mansfield substitute by a 
vote of seventy-three to twenty-seven.95 After Senate passage, H.R. 7152 was sent back 
to the House for its approval of the Senate's amendments. On July 2, 1964, the House 
approved the Senate's amendments by a vote of 289-126.96 The Civil Rights Act of 1964 
became law when President Johnson signed the bill later the same day. 
The Senate legislative history is not as clear as that of the House. The statements 
of Senators Humphrey and Kuchel, the bipartisan leaders of H.R. 7152, and those of 
Senators Clark and Case, the bipartisan captains responsible for title VII, must be given 
great weight because of their important role in the passage of title VII. Chief Justice 
Rehnquist's interpretation of the legislative history, although it finds greater support in 
the Senate history, is still weaker than that offered by Justice Brennan. Chief Justice 
Rehnquist seizes upon vague and poorly worded legislative history. Read in context, it 
is clear that the Senate never referred to the remedies which may be ordered upon a 
finding of discrimination. 
Senators Ervin and Hill argued that title VII would permit the EEOC to force 
employers to hire minority individuals "although the employer might not need the 
additional employees, and although they might bring his business into bankruptcy."97 
Senators Ervin and Hill continued the argument first begun in the House that discrim-
ination would be defined as meaning racial imbalance. The scenarios they described 
involve innocent employers who through no fault of their own maintain a racially 
imbalanced workforce, not employers who have intentionally discriminated. 
Senator Humphrey stated that "there is nothing in [title VII] that will give any 
power to the Commission or to any court to require hiring, firing, or promotion ... to 
88 110 CONGo REC. 12723 (1964). 
89 Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 247 (1977) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting ). 
90 See, e.g., 110 CONGo REC. 13077, 13079 (1964). 
91Id. at 13319. 
92 Vaas, supra note 37, at 446. 
93 110 CONGo REC. 14328 (1964). 
94Id. at 14484. 
95Id. at 14511. 
96Id. at 15897. 
97Id. at 4764. 
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meet a racial 'quota' or to achieve a certain racial balance."9H It appears that Senator 
Humphrey was referring to a court's remedial powers after a finding of discrimination. 
Senator Humphrey made it clear throughout the Senate's consideration that he was 
merely responding to the argument that innocent employers would be forced to imple-
ment quotas: 
[T]itle VII] is pictured by its opponents and detractors as in intrusion of 
numerous Federal inspectors into our economic life. These inspectors would 
presumably dictate to labor unions and their members with regard to ... 
racial balance .... Nothing could be further from the truth ... the court 
cannot order preferential hiring or promotion consideration for any partic-
ular race . . . .99 
Senators Clark and Case stated in their interpretive memorandum to title VII that 
"no court order can require hiring, reinstatement, admission to membership, or payment 
of back pay for anyone who was not discriminated against ... this is stated expressly in 
the last sentence of [section 706(g)]."IOO Chief Justice Rehnquist states that this "made it 
clear that a court was not authorized to give preferential treatment to nonvictims."lol 
Chief Justice Rehnquist's interpretation is too broad. Although the statement is extremely 
imprecise, the Senators were repeating the point that an employer who had not discrim-
inated against his or her employees would not be forced to favor minority employees. 
The overwhelming weight of legislative history suggests that Senators Clark and Case's 
statement did not refer to remedies which may imposed on a employer or labor union 
after a court finding of discrimination. 
Section 703U), stating that "[n]othing contained in this subchapter shall be inter-
preted to require any [employer or labor union] to grant preferential treatment to any 
individual or to any group ... on account of an imbalance ... with respect to the total 
number or percentage of persons of any race"I02 was adopted to convince opponents 
that title VII required neither quotas nor racial balancing. The adoption of 703U) 
supports Justice Brennan's contention that Congress focused solely on the issue of 
whether an innocent employer with an imbalanced workforce would have to implement 
quotas. The claims that 706(g) would require racial balancing became so strong that 
Congress was forced to amend title VII to prove otherwise. Justice Brennan claims that 
703U) ended most of the complaints of racial balancing and quotas. I03 Justice Brennan's 
contention that "while Congress strongly opposed the use Df quotas or preferences 
merely to maintain racial balance, it gave no intimation as to whether such measures 
would be acceptable as remedies for Title VII violations"!04 is strongly supported by the 
Senate's legislative history. Justice Brennan concluded that "[i]n the absence of any 
98 [d. at 6549. 
99 [d. at 6563. 
100 !d. at 7214. 
101 Local Number 93 v. City of Cleveland, 106 S. Ct. 3063, 3086 (1986) (Rehnquist,J., dissenting) 
(quoting Firefighters v. Stotts, 467 U.S. 561, 579-82 (1984». As discussed supra, Justice White, who 
authored the Stotts decision, has retreated from the position of denying relief to non-victims in all 
circumstances. 
102 42 U.S.c. § 2000e-2OHI982). 
103 Local 28 Of Sheet Metal Workers v. EEOC, 106 S. Ct. 3019, 3043 (1986). Chief Justice 
Rehnquist reached the same conclusion in Steelworkers of America v. Weber. 443 U.S. 193, 247 
(1977) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
104 Local 28 Of Sheet Metal Workers, 106 S. Ct. at 3044. 
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indication that Congress intended to limit a district court's remedial authority in a way 
which would frustrate the court's ability to enforce Title VII's mandate, we decline to 
fashion such a limitation ourseives."105 Justice Brennan contends that "make whole" 
relief may sometimes justify quotas which benefit both victims and nonvictims. 
Although the Solicitor General advanced the contrary argument in Sheet Metal 
Workers and Firefighters, the Solicitor General stated in his brief for the EEOC in Steel-
workers v. Weber that: 
To be sure, there was considerable concern that the Act would be construed 
to require the use of quota systems to establish and maintain racial balance 
in employer's work forces. The sponsors of the bill repeatedly assured its 
opponents that this was not the intent and would not be the effect of the 
statute. But these assurances did not restrictions on remedies that could be 
ordered after a finding of discrimination. Instead, they made it clear that 
the statute would not impose a duty on employers to establish racially bal-
anced workforces .... 106 
The Senate did not consider the Issue of whether title VII remedies were to be 
limited to the identifiable victims of discrimination. The Senate's history, although vague 
and unclear in areas, was concerned with the effects of title VII upon an innocent 
empoloyer with a racially imbalanced workforce. 
VII. THE EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY ACT OF 1972 
The Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972 107 amended title VII in several 
areas. The language of section 706(g) was modified to empower a court to order "such 
affirmative action as may be appropriate, which may include, but is not limited to rein-
statement or hiring of employees ... or any other equitable relief as the court deems 
appropriate"108 (emphasis added). Senator Williams, who introduced a section-by-section 
analysis to accompany the Conference Committee Report on the 1972 Act, stated that 
the changes in section 706(g) were "intended to give the courts wide discretion in 
exercising their equitable powers to fashion the most complete relief possible .... " 109 
Justice Brennan cites three factors in support of the view that the 1972 amendments 
established the legality of race conscious remedies in title VII actions. First, the Confer-
ence Committee Report accompanying the 1972 Act stressed the need for "make-whole 
relief for the victims of unlawful discrimination."ll0 However, Justice Brennan points 
out that "nowhere did Congress suggest that a court lacked the power to award pref-
erential remedies that might benefit nonvictims."lll The argument that Congress meant 
to include what it did not expressly exclude is of questionable value. 
105Id. 
106 Local 28 Of Sheet Metal Workers, 106 S. Ct. at 3044-45 n. 38 (quoting Brief for the United 
States and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission at 29-30, United Steelworkers of 
America v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1977). 
107 Pub. L. No. 92-261, 86 Stat. 103, (1972) (amending 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2000e-17 (1972)). 
108 42 U .S.c. § 2000e-5(g). 
109 118 CONGo REC. 7168 (1972). 
110 [d. 
III Local 28 Of Sheet Metal Workers V. EEOC, 106 S. Ct. 3019, 3045 (1986). 
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Second, Justice Brennan also notes that Senator Ervin offered two amendments to 
title VII during the 1972 debates which would have prohibited all affirmative race-
conscious remedies. 112 The clear defeat of both amendments shows how Congress ex-
plicitly approved of race conscious relief broad enough to benefit individuals who were 
not the personal victims of discrimination. 1l3 
Third, Justice Brennan notes that the most compelling evidence that the 1972 
Congress approved of the use of race-conscious affirmative remedies in title VII litigation 
is that by 1972 "both the Executive and Judicial branches had used such measures to 
remedy past discrimination."1l4 If Congress had disapproved of these remedies, it would 
not have broadened the scope of relief available under 706(g). Justice Brennan quotes 
the Solicitor General's brief in Steelworkers v. Weber: 
In light of Congress' keen awareness of the kinds of remedies courts had 
been granting in Title VII cases, and in light of the protests from Senators 
Ervin and others over the use of race-conscious remedies, th[e] amendment 
to Section 706(g) provides substantial support for the proposition that Con-
gress intended that numerical, race-conscious relief be available under Title 
VII to remedy employment discrimination. I IS 
Although Congress failed to consider race-conscious remedies for title VII violations 
in 1964, such remedies were explicitly approved in 1972. The legislative history of the 
1972 Act affirms Justice Brennan's view that quotas and preferences broad enough to 
benefit non victims are permissible under title VII. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
Twenty-three years after the passage of title VII the Supreme Court still has not 
defined the class of individuals entitled to the remedies enumerated in the Act. Lower 
courts are forced to fashion title VII relief in the absence of sufficient guidance from 
the Court. It is imperative that the Supreme Court resolve the victim/nonvictim issue it 
inadequately addressed in Sheet Metal Workers and Firefighters. 
Justice Brennan's interpretation of title VII's legislative history is clearly superior to 
the interpretation offered by Chief Justice Rehnquist. Justice Brennan shows that the 
eighty-eighth Congress which passed the Civil Rights Act of 1964 did not, and certainly 
could not, envision the type of remedies involved in Sheet Metal Workers and Firefighters. 
Congress at that time was concerned that quotas would be imposed on innocent em-
ployers and labor unions. Neither the House nor the Senate considered the possibility 
that quotas would be used to remedy past discrimination. Chief Justice Rehnquist bases 
his interpretation on poorly articulated statements that title VII would not force quotas 
upon employers and labor unions which were racially imbalanced. The legislative history 
cited by Justice Rehnquist is simply not on point. 
ll'[d. at 382-83. 
ll'[d. 
114 [d. at 383-84. 
115 Local 28 Of Sheet Metal Workers, 106 S. Ct. at 3047 (quoting Brief for the United States and 
the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission at 35, United Steelworkers of America v. Weber, 
443 U.S. 193 (1977)). 
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Justice Brennan explains how the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972 
explicitly permitted race-conscious relief such as the quotas and preferences in Sheet 
Metal Workers and Firefighters. 
At least five Justices support the view affirmative relief may be fashioned to benefit 
individuals who are the actual victims of discrimination. Until the Court officially sanc-
tions such relief, however, there will continue to be unnecessary confusion in the lower 
courts. 
STEVEN NAPOLITANO 
